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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
CANDELO PEREZ LOPEZ, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20030568-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
The State's Reply Brief of Appellant responds to Points A.l, A.2, and B.2 of 
defendant's Brief of Appellee. The State relies on its opening Brief of Appellant to 
supplement the arguments it now presents. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that the trial court acted properly by considering his Finlayson 
merger claim in a pre-trial motion. Aplt. Br. at 6-13. He further claims that, because his 
motion was heard after he had waived a preliminary hearing, the evidentiary standard 
applicable to preliminary hearings did not apply to his motion but, rather, that the State 
had to establish separate offenses by a preponderance of the evidence. Aple. Br. at 13-18. 
Finally, he claims that the evidence did not do so in this case. Aple. Br. at 18-38. The 
State challenges all three of defendant's contentions. 
A. REPLY TO POINT A.l OF DEFENDANT'S BRIEF: UNDER 
HAWATMEH, A TRIAL COURT MAY PROPERLY CONSIDER A 
FINLAYSONMERGER CLAIM ONLY AFTER THE DEFENDANT 
HAS BEEN CONVICTED OF THE KIDNAPPING CHARGE UPON 
WHICH SUCH A CLAIM IS BASED. 
Defendant cites State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638 (Utah 1996), and four federal cases 
to support his claim that defendant properly filed and the trial court properly considered 
his Finlayson merger claim before trial. Aple. Br. at 7-8, 11-12. However, Crosby and 
defendant's federal cases address multiplicity claims, not merger claims. Although 
related, multiplicity and merger address different issues arising at different stages of a 
criminal proceeding. Multiplicity claims arise at the pleading stage; merger claims arise 
only after trial once multiple convictions are imminent. Accordingly, rules governing the 
former do not govern the latter. For this reason, defendant's cases do not support the trial 
court's pre-trial merger ruling here. 
Alternatively, defendant asserts that State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, 26 P.3d 223, 
and State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 179, 72 P.3d 692, cert denied, 84 P.3d 239 (Utah 
2003), support the trial court's reaching defendant's merger claim in a pre-trial hearing. 
Aple. Br. at 9-10. Hawatmeh clearly does not. Smith, to the extent it conflicts with or 
misinterprets Hawatmeh, must be rejected. 
2 
1. Merger claims, unlike multiplicity claims, are not ripe until a 
defendant has actually been convicted of the charges that 
allegedly merge; therefore, defendant's reliance on multiplicity 
cases to assert that the trial court properly considered his 
Finlayson merger claim before trial is misplaced. 
Defendant cites to numerous cases addressing multiplicity claims to support his 
claim that the trial court properly considered his merger claim before trial. See Aple. Br. 
at 7-8, 11-12 (citing State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638 (Utah 1996), United States v. 
Chilingirian, 280 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Dixon, 273 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 
2001); United States v. Grinkiewicz, 873 F.2d 253 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. 
Inmon, 568 F.2d 326 (3rd Cir. 1977)). However, although related, merger and the 
doctrine of multiplicity are distinct doctrines that address distinct concerns arising at 
distinct stages of a criminal proceeding. Therefore, rules governing multiplicity claims 
do not apply to merger claims. 
a. The distinction between multiplicity claims and merger 
claims. 
Both merger and the doctrine of multiplicity arise from the double jeopardy 
guarantee that protects a defendant from receiving multiple punishments for a single 
crime. See State v. Grayhurst, 852 A.2d 491, 500 (RI 2004) ("Merger is essentially a 
double jeopardy argument."); United States v. Davis, 306 F.3d 398, 417 (6th Cir. 2002), 
cert denied, 537 U.S. 1208 (2003) (noting that rule against multiplicity implicates double 
jeopardy protections); State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, \ 143, 20 P.3d 342 (noting that one 
facet of double jeopardy is "protection against multiple punishments for the same crime"). 
3 
However, they are distinct doctrines that, although tending to coalesce when considered at 
the end of a trial, address different issues arising at different stages of a criminal 
proceeding: 
Multiple punishment challenges generally arise in one of two 
broad contexts: 
"(a) A statute or a portion thereof proscribes designated 
conduct, and the question is whether the defendant's conduct 
constitutes more than one violation of this proscription. Thus, 
murdering two people simultaneously might well warrant two 
punishments but stealing two one-dollar bills might not. (b) 
Two statutes or two portions of a single statute proscribe 
certain conduct, and the question is whether the defendant can 
be punished twice because his conduct violates both 
proscriptions. Thus, selling liquor on a Sunday might warrant 
two punishments for violating a prohibition law and a blue 
law, but feloniously entering a bank and robbing a bank, 
though violative of two statutes, might warrant but a single 
punishment" 
Brown v. State, 535 A.2d 485, 487 (Md. 1988) (quoting Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 
386, 393-94 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)). 
As the Maryland court explains, the first context involves the doctrine of 
multiplicity. "Whether a particular course of conduct constitutes one or more violations of 
a single statutory offense affects an accused in three distinct, albeit related, ways: 
multiplicity in the indictment or information, multiple convictions for the same offense, 
and multiple sentences for the same offense." Id; see also Lafave, § 19.3(c) (2003) 
(explaining that multiplicity in charges "is often the product of a prosecutor's mistaken 
assumption that a particular statute creates several separate offenses rather than a single 
crime that can be accomplished through multiple means" or "when a series of repeated 
4 
acts are charged as separate crimes but the defendant claims they are part of a continuous 
transaction and therefore a single crime"); United States v. Allen, 13 F.3d 105, 107 (4th 
Cir. 1993) (holding "the doctrine of'multiplicity' . . . , strickly speaking, refers to the 
charging of each act in a series of identical acts as though it were a separate crime"); cf. 
42 CJ.S. Indictments and Informations § 160 (2004) (noting federal rule of criminal 
procedure addresses multiplicity issue and "is intended to eliminate use of multiple counts 
for purpose of alleging commission of an offense by different means or in different 
ways"). 
Multiplicity is a pleading defect that "turn[s] on the unit of prosecution of the 
offense and this is ordinarily determined by reference to legislative intent." Brown, 535 
A.2d at 488 & n.5. Multiplicity, therefore, is an issue that may be addressed before trial. 
See Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c) ("Any defense, objection or request, including a request for 
rulings on the admissibility of evidence, which is capable of determination without the 
trial of the general issue, may be raised prior to trial by written motion.") (emphasis 
added); Dixon, 273 F.3d at 642 (holding that although claim of multiplicity of convictions 
must be raised before trial, claim of multiplicity of sentences may be addressed for first 
time on appeal); Grinkiewicz, 873 F.2d at 255 (same); but see United States v. Universal 
C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 225 (1952) ("Whether an aggregate of acts constitute a 
single course of conduct and therefore a single offense, or more than one, may not be 
capable of ascertainment merely from the bare allegations of an information and may 
have to await the trial on the facts."). 
5 
In contrast, the second context, in which a court must determine "whether two 
different offenses are the same for double jeopardy purposes," arises "in the context of 
merger of offenses in a single trial and successive trials for the same offense." Brown, 
535A.2dat488. 
"Merger," unlike multiplicity, is "a device to amalgamate separate and legitimate 
convictions so as to avoid multiple punishments." Burkett v. State, 633 A.2d 902, 909-10 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (emphasis added); Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) 1009 
(defining "merger" as "[t]he absorption of a lesser included offense into a more serious 
offense when a person is charged with both crimes, so that the person is not subject to 
double jeopardy"). Thus, in contrast to a multiplicity claim, in which a defendant argues 
that multiple acts constitute a single crime under the law, "[i]t is not the case [with 
merger] that the defendant is not guilty of the lesser offenses; it is rather the case that he 
is guilty of those lesser offenses but simply is not to be twice punished." White v. State, 
639 A.2d 194, 199 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994). 
Merger does not identify a pleading defect. Thus, merger "does not prevent the 
State from charging a defendant with multiple crimes, even when those crimes may 
merge." State v. Michietli, 937 P.2d 587, 592 (Wash. 1997) (en banc). 
Rather, a claim of merger "arises only after the State has successfully obtained 
guilty verdicts on the charges that allegedly merge—if the jury acquits on one of the 
charges, the merger issue never arises." Id at 592; cf. United States v. Sarracino, 131 
F.3d 943, 946, 950-51 (10th Cir. 1997) (reaching on appeal defendant's claim that 
6 
kidnapping conviction merged with murder conviction even though defendant apparently 
did not raise issue at trial); United States v. Etsitty, 130 F.3d 420, 426-27 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(reaching on appeal defendant's claim that kidnapping conviction merged with assault 
convictions even though defendant apparently did not raise issue until after trial). 
Thus, unlike with a multiplicity claim, "[t]he court cannot use the merger doctrine 
to dismiss a charge prior to trial because the court cannot predict which charges on which 
the defendant will be convicted." Michielli, 937 P.2d at 592; see also Richardson v. State, 
2000 WL 852442 (Alaska App. 2000) (rejecting claim that "defendant is entitled to 
require the trial court to merge charges before trial"); Bradley v. State, 533 S.E.2d 727, 
730-31 (Ga. 2000) (holding that, where convictions were overturned on appeal, "it is 
premature to reach the issue of whether the two offenses must merge for sentencing"); 
Burkett v. State, 633 A.2d 902, 909-10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (holding that "[m]erger 
. . . is a question that does not arise until the time of sentencing"); State v. Moore, 504 
A.2d 804, 809 (N.J. Super. 1985) (holding merger motion "is premature when it is 
considered at the pretrial stage"); People v. Melendez, 533 N.Y.S.2d 361, 362-63 (Crim. 
Ct. N.Y. 1988) (concluding that "a motion to dismiss under the merger doctrine a count of 
unlawful imprisonment from an otherwise sufficient complaint is premature when the 
fact-finding process has not yet taken place"). 
7 
The Utah Supreme Court recognizes the distinction between multiplicity claims 
and merger claims. Thus, the court's merger cases, not its multiplicity cases, govern 
defendant's Finlayson merger claim.1 
b. Crosby and Finlayson confirm that Utah law treats 
multiplicity and merger claims differently. 
Defendant claims that, under State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638 (Utah 1996), "to be 
timely a motion for application of the merger doctrine must be made before a case goes to 
the jury." Aple. Br. at 7-8 (discussing). However, Crosby is a multiplicity case. As State 
v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, 994 P.2d 1243, clearly indicates, multiplicity cases do not 
govern when merger claims must be raised in order to be timely. More importantly, the 
issue in this case is not when a defendant may properly file a Finlayson merger motion, 
but, rather, when a trial court may properly consider it. Even Finlayson does not address 
that issue. Only State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, 26 P.3d 223, does. 
In Crosby, the defendant claimed that his counsel provided ineffective assistance 
in failing to challenge his conviction on three counts of theft based on conduct which 
clearly under Utah law should have been consolidated into one charge. See Crosby, 927 
P.2d at 646. On appeal, the supreme court noted that defense counsel "failed to raise the 
issue during trial, instead filing a motion to arrest judgment or, in the alternative, to 
consolidate the convictions." Id. at 646. The supreme court then held that, because an 
!The State recognizes that certain jurisdictions appear to use the term multiplicity 
to refer to both traditional multiplicity claims and traditional merger claims. See, e.g., 
State v. Morfitt, 956 P.2d 719, 728-29 (Kan. App. 1998); State v. Derango, 613 N.W.2d 
833, 841-42 (Wise. 2000). However, as discussed below, Utah is not one of those states. 
8 
objection to an information "that is not made either before or during trial is deemed 
waived/5 counsel's motion was "untimely." Id. (citing State v. Lairby, 669 P.2d 1187, 
1192 (Utah 1984), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 628, 
631 n.8 (Utah 1987)). The court nonetheless held that, "[g]iven the facts of this case and 
clear Utah case law on this issue,. . . the convictions should be consolidated." Id. 
Based on the discussion above, Crosby's claim was clearly one of multiplicity, not 
merger. See pp. 3-8 supra. Indeed, the words "merge" and "merger" appear nowhere in 
the court's discussion. See Crosby, 927 P.2d at 645-46; see also State v. Morrison, 2001 
UT 73, f^ f 23-26, 31 P.3d 547 (reviewing trial court's pre-trial ruling on defendant's 
motion to "consolidate" fifty counts of sexual exploitation of a minor into one count 
under rule against multiplicity; the words "merge" and "merger" appear nowhere in the 
court's discussion). Thus, Crosby does not mandate when a defendant must present his 
merger claim in order for it to be deemed timely. 
State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, 994 P.2d 1243, confirms this. In Finlayson, the 
defendant was charged with aggravated kidnapping, rape, and forcible sodomy. 2000 UT 
10, \ 1. On appeal, the defendant claimed that his trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance in failing to move for merger of his aggravated kidnapping conviction with his 
other convictions. Id. at \ 9. The supreme court agreed where defense counsel "made no 
objection to this charge, and failed to raise this at any time, either during trial, or 
following the conviction in a motion to vacate." Id. at ^ 24, 25. 
9 
Thus, under Finlayson, a defendant may properly move for merger after conviction 
"in a motion to vacate." Id. In reaching that conclusion, Finlayson implicitly 
distinguishes between merger claims, which do not arise until the last stage of a criminal 
proceeding and thus may be raised at that stage, and multiplicity claims, which arise 
before trial and thus must be raised at an earlier point in the proceedings. 
However, as previously stated, the issue in this case is not when a defendant may 
properly raise a Finlayson merger claim. Rather, the issue is when a trial court may 
properly rule on that claim. Only State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, 26 P.3d 223, answers 
that question. 
2. Under Hawatmeh, a trial court may consider a Finlayson merger 
claim only after a defendant has been convicted of the 
kidnapping upon which such a claim is based. 
Defendant contends that State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, 26 P.3d 223, supports 
his claim that the trial court properly considered his pre-trial Finalyson merger motion. 
Aple. Br. at 9-10. To the contrary, Hawatmeh clearly establishes that the trial court's 
Finlayson ruling was premature and therefore improper. 
In Hawatmeh, defendants were charged with aggravated kidnapping and 
aggravated assault for conduct that spanned two days. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 5 1 , ^ 1 , 4 -
12. After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate, relying on the Finlayson merger doctrine, 
reduced the aggravated kidnapping charge to simple kidnapping. Id. at |^ 2. In reversing 
the magistrate's decision, the supreme court made clear that the Finlayson merger 
doctrine does not apply to pre-trial proceedings: 
10 
The district court made its ruling based on the case of State v. 
Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, 994 P.2d 1243, where we held that the 
defendant's detention of his rape victim before and during the sexual 
assault did not support a kidnaping conviction because it was 
"incidental to the assault," and thus, merged into the underlying 
sexual assault. Id. at Tf 23. Finlayson is not applicable to the instant 
case, however, because we are not dealing with convictions for 
aggravated kidnaping, but merely aggravated kidnaping charges. 
Furthermore, although Finlayson may be applicable to the 
aggravated assault charge based on events on October 13, defendants 
do not dispute that the simple kidnaping charge is a separate 
incident, based only upon October 14 events. The State argues that 
evidence regarding October 14 events is sufficient to support an 
inference of aggravated kidnaping. Therefore, we treat the events of 
October 14 as a crime separate from the assault on October 13, and 
merger is not at issue. 
Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, \ 17 n.3 (emphasis added). The clear import of the emphasized 
language is that the proper time for a trial court to consider a Finlayson merger claim is 
after a defendant has been convicted of the kidnapping charge on which such a claim 
rests. See also Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, ffif 19-20. (discussing test under State v. Couch, 
635 P.2d 89, 92 (Utah 1981), "for determining when a defendant's kidnapping conviction 
is sustainable in addition to his sexual assault conviction") (emphasis added). 
Defendant ignores this Hawatmeh language, however, in favor of admittedly 
ambiguous language in the next sentence. According to defendant, the court's statement 
that "Finlayson may be applicable to the aggravated assault charge based on events on 
October 13," Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, ^ 17 n3, indicates that "the court in Hawatmeh 
recognized" that Finlayson may apply "at the preliminary hearing phase" of a trial. Aple. 
Br. at 10. 
11 
Defendant's contention rests on the premise that the supreme court announced a 
clear holding in one sentence and then completely contradicted itself in the next. 
Defendant's contention must be, and easily can be, rejected. 
Given the clarity with which the supreme court held that "Finlayson is not 
applicable" to pre-conviction proceedings, there are at least two reasonable interpretations 
of the court's next sentence. The first is that, in using the phrase "although Finlayson 
may be applicable," the court actually meant, "even if Finlayson were applicable." The 
second is that the court was merely commenting that, under a different factual scenario 
than the one presented, Finlayson may have become applicable at a later stage of the 
proceedings. Cf. State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 179, \ 11 n.4, 72 P.3d 692 ('"While the 
Double Jeopardy Clause may protect a defendant against cumulative punishments for 
convictions on the same offense, the Clause does not prohibit the State from prosecuting 
[defendants] for such multiple offenses in a single prosecution.'") (quoting Ohio v. 
Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 500 (1984)), cert, denied, 84 P.3d 239 (Utah 2003). 
Because either of these alternatives provides a reasonable interpretation of the 
"may be applicable" language in Hawatmeh while avoiding an interpretation premised on 
the supreme court's announcing a holding in one sentence and then immediately 
contradicting itself in the next, the only proper interpretation of Hawatmeh's Footnote 3 is 
that a Finlayson merger claim is properly considered only after a defendant has been 
convicted of both the aggravated kidnapping charge and the alleged host crime. 
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Moreover, contrary to this Court's suggestion in State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 179, 
% 11 n.4, 72 P.3d 692, see Aple. Br. at 10, such an interpretation of Hawatmeh does not 
conflict with Finlayson. In Smith, the State argued that the defendant failed to preserve 
his non-Finlayson merger claim because he presented it "prior to Smith's convictions." 
Smith, 2003 UT App 179, If 11. This Court noted that the State's argument was based on 
the Hawatmeh language and that the State "interprets this language to mean that the issue 
of merger cannot be properly considered 'until after a jury has rendered its verdict and 
defendant is subject to multiple convictions for the same act." Id. (emphasis in original). 
This Court concluded that "a brief review of Finlayson clearly contradicts this 
interpretation," where Finlayson "examined the nature of the charges arrayed against the 
defendant and determined that 'the facts of this case do not support a conviction for 
aggravated kidnaping . . . [y]et defendant's counsel made no objection to this charge, and 
failed to raise this at any time, either during trial, or following the conviction on a motion 
to vacate.'" Id. (quoting Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, f 24) (emphasis by this Court). 
However, language in Finlayson quoted in Smith did not address when a trial court 
may properly consider a Finlayson merger claim, but only when a defendant may properly 
present such a claim. Thus, contrary to this Court's suggestion in Smith, Finlayson does 
nothing to undermine Hawatmeh's holding that Finlayson does not apply when "we are 
not dealing with convictions for aggravated kidnaping, but merely aggravated kidnaping 
charges." Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, \ 17 n.3. 
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Finally, Hawatmeh's holding is consistent both with the general merger cases cited 
above, see pp. 6-7 supra, and with the only cases found by the State specifically 
addressing the propriety of reaching Finlayson-type merger motions before trial. See 
People v. Morales, 538 N.Y.S.2d 541, 542 (A.D. 1989) ("Since the [merger] rule's 
purpose is to prevent the unfair enhancement of punishment by the kidnapping statute for 
other substantive crimes committed by defendant, the appropriate time for the court to 
decide the issue is after trial"), appeal withdrawn, 544 N.E.2d 233 (N.Y. 1989); People 
v. Melendez, 533 N.Y.S.2d 361, 362 (Ct. Crim. N.Y. 1988) (rejecting defendant's pre-trial 
Finlayson-type merger motion where "[m]aking such a determination is a fact-specific 
process" in which "[t]he timing of the events [and "means employed to detain a victim"] 
is crucial"); State v. McGuire, 686 N.E.2d 1112, 1119-20 (Ohio 1997) (rejecting claim 
that trial counsel's "fail[ure] to seek before trial the merger of the kidnapping and rape 
charges" constituted ineffective assistance where statute allowed for multiple charges and 
merger was not issue until after conviction). 
The reason for this result is self-evident: "[0]nly after the prosecution has 
presented its case to the jury will the trial court have all the facts underlying the charges 
before it and be able to make an informed decision about whether the kidnapping charges 
should or should not be merged." Morales, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 542. 
Any other result would essentially force the State to conduct a trial before a 
trial—in which the State must present all of its evidence supporting conviction for the 
kidnapping charge as well as the alleged host crime—in order to provide the court with 
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"all the facts underlying the charges before it," Morales, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 542, and then, 
force the trial court to "predict [based on that evidence] which charges on which the 
defendant will be convicted," MichiellU 937 P.2d at 592. 
Because the trial court's consideration of defendant's Finlayson merger claim 
before trial conflicts with Hawatmeh, this Court should reverse the trial court's dismissal 
of defendant's aggravated kidnapping charge.2 
B. REPLY TO POINT A.2 OF DEFENDANT'S BRIEF: BECAUSE 
DEFENDANT'S FINLAYSON MERGER CLAIM WAS 
PREMATURE, THE TRIAL COURT COULD PROPERLY 
CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS ONLY AS A 
MOTION TO QUASH BINDOVER, TO WHICH THE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING EVIDENTIARY STANDARD APPLIED 
Defendant claims that, because his motion was heard after he had waived a 
preliminary hearing, the evidentiary standard applicable to preliminary hearings did not 
apply to his motion and the State had to establish separate offenses by a preponderance of 
the evidence. Aple. Br. at 13-18. Because the trial court lacked discretion to consider 
defendant's Finlayson merger claim before trial, defendant's motion to dismiss could 
properly be considered by the trial court before trial only as a motion to quash. 
Preliminary hearing standards apply to such motions, and defendant should not be 
2The only other case defendant cites, see Aple. Br. at 12-13, does not even address 
the propriety of pre-trial merger motions, but rather, only the general reasons why the trial 
court rather than the jury should decide the Finlayson-like merger issue. See State v. 
Warner, 626 A.2d 205, 208 (R.I. 1993) (holding doctrine's "primary thrust is to avoid an 
excess of prosecutorial zeal," which is a "question[]... to be determined in the first 
instance by the trial justice subject to review by this court"). Nothing in Warner requires 
that a trial court address a Finlayson-type merger claim before trial. 
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allowed to increase the State's burden of proof merely by waiving a preliminary hearing 
and then filing a motion to dismiss in the trial court. 
In this case, defendant waived his right to a preliminary hearing (R. 42). Thus, he 
was bound over on both charges without an evidentiary hearing (R. 42). Defendant then 
filed his motion to dismiss based on merger with the trial court (R. 48-53). Because no 
evidentiary hearing was held prior to bindover, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing 
before deciding defendant's motion (R. 83; R. 148:passim). 
However, as previously discussed, the trial court could not properly consider 
defendant's merger motion at this point. See Point A supra. Thus, the only issue 
properly before the trial court before trial was whether the evidence presented at the pre-
trial hearing was sufficient to survive a motion to quash the bindover. Cf Kunzler v. 
O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah App. 1993) (holding that "title of a motion is not 
dispositive"); see also People v. Melendez, 533 N.Y.S.2d 361, 362 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. 1988) 
(ruling that, because pre-trial merger claim was premature, only issue before trial was 
whether "legally sufficient charges have been brought," i.e., whether the State has 
"presented] & prima facie case that supports the charges and the defendant's commission 
thereof). As discussed in the State's Brief of Appellant, the preliminary hearing 
evidentiary standard applies to motions to quash, and the evidence presented at the pre-
trial hearing was sufficient to survive defendant's motion. See Aplt. Br. at 9-13; see also 
State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435, 437 (Utah 1998). 
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Moreover, even if the trial court could properly consider defendant's Finlayson 
merger claim before trial, neither defendant's cases nor common sense mandate 
imposition of a preponderance of the evidence burden of proof. In claiming that the 
preponderance standard applies, defendant relies on three federal and two state cases. See 
Aple. Br. at 16-17 (discussing State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 300 (Utah 1992); State v. 
Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 467 and n.7 (Utah App. 1991); United States v. Jabara, 644 F.2d 
574, 576-77 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Stricklin, 591 F.2d 1112, 1118-19 (5th Cir. 
1979); United States v. Inmon, 568 F.2d 326, 331-32 (3rd Cir. 1977)). 
All of those cases address the standard of proof applicable to pre-trial motions 
raising claims that a defendant's constitutional rights will be violated if trial proceeds 
without a ruling on the motions. See Inmon, 568 F.2d at 328-29 (addressing challenge by 
defendant to current charges as former jeopardy where he had already been convicted on 
similar charges; noting forcing defendant to wait until after second trial "would . . . have 
required that the defendant submit to the violation of his constitutional right not to be 
tried again for the same offense in order to raise the issue"); Stricklin, 591 F.2d at 1115 
(same); Jabara, 644 F.2d at 575-76 (same); Allen, 839 P.2d at 300 (addressing challenge 
to voluntariness of defendant's pre-trial statements); Carter, 812 P.2d at 467 (addressing 
challenge to voluntariness of consent to search). 
Defendant's constitutional rights simply are not yet and, indeed, may never be at 
stake here. No constitutional right is implicated in a pre-trial Finlayson merger motion 
because it is not yet clear on which charges, if any, defendant will be convicted. See Ohio 
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v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 500 (1984) ('" While the Double Jeopardy Clause may protect a 
defendant against cumulative punishments for convictions on the same offense, the 
Clause does not prohibit the State from prosecuting [defendants] for such multiple 
offenses in a single prosecution.'"). 
Thus, no reason exists to unnecessarily burden prosecutors, the courts, and 
witnesses by imposing a standard of proof upon the State that inevitably requires a trial 
before a trial, see p. 14-15 supra, on an issue most appropriately addressed at the 
conclusion of trial. 
Consequently, this Court should reject defendant's claim that, merely because he 
waived his preliminary hearing and waited until he was bound over to challenge the 
charges against him, a higher standard of proof applies than if he had challenged the 
charges at the preliminary hearing stage. 
C. REPLY TO POINT B.2 OF DEFENDANT'S BRIEF: EVEN IF THE 
TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED DEFENDANT'S 
FINLAYSONMERGER CLAIM BEFORE TRIAL, THE COURT 
ERRED IN DISMISSING DEFENDANT'S AGGRAVATED 
KIDNAPPING CHARGE 
Defendant claims that the evidence here supported the trial court's merger ruling. 
See Aple. Br. at 22-32. In fact, the evidence was quite clear that defendant committed 
two distinct crimes. 
As a preliminary matter, defendant notes that, in making its evidentiary argument, 
"the state has not challenged the trial court's findings of fact relating to resolution of the 
merger issue." Aple. Br. at 20. Assuming arguendo that the trial court properly 
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considered defendant's Finlayson merger claim before trial, the State does not challenge 
the trial court's factual findings. However, as the State's Brief of Appellant made clear, 
the trial court's findings are incomplete. Cf. Aplt. Br. at 3-5, 15-16. This Court should 
consider the complete evidentiary record in reviewing the trial court's ruling. 
According to Katrina's pre-trial testimony, defendant locked her in his room, put a 
gun to her head and threatened her and her family while he made several telephone calls, 
and poked her with a piece of broken glass (R. 148:11-14). The aggravated kidnapping 
was at that point complete. 
Katrina was then able to unlock the door and escape (R. 148:11-14). Although 
defendant followed her out of the room, caught up with her in another room, and beat her 
with the gun several times in that other room, Katrina was able to gain the attention of the 
home's owner, who told defendant to leave Katrina alone (R. 148:14-16). 
At that point, hostilities ceased. Defendant asked Katrina to return to his room, 
agreed to her demand to put the gun away, and then told her she could keep the door open 
because "everything was going to be okay [and they] were just going to talk" (R. 148:16, 
20). Only after this cessation of violence did defendant commit a new volitional act in 
hitting Katrina again and then attempting to murder her by strangulation (R. 148:148:16, 
20). 
Based on this evidence, the State's argument is not that the kidnapping continued 
throughout the thirty-five minutes to an hour during which Katrina and defendant were 
together in his home. Rather, the State's argument is that the aggravated kidnapping was 
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complete when Katrina was able to flee from defendant's room after defendant had 
locked her in it, put a gun to her head, and threatened her and her family. Then, after a 
cessation of hostilities, a new crime was committed—attempted murder—when defendant 
persuaded Katrina to return to his room, and he subsequently tried to strangle her. 
In challenging the State's claim, defendant contends that the State has not 
adequately briefed its claim that his aggravated kidnapping and attempted murder charges 
do not merge because the State did not specifically address the application of each of the 
three Buggs factors to the facts of this case. See Aple. Br. at 22. However, where, as 
here, two distinct criminal acts occurred and the evidence necessary to prove aggravated 
kidnapping based on the use of a dangerous weapon was obviously separate from the 
evidence necessary to prove attempted murder, any greater discussion by the State of the 
Buggs factors—which arguably should not even apply—was unnecessary. Cf State v. 
Burden, 69 P.3d 1120, 944 (Kan. 2003) (holding Buggs factors apply only when the 
variation of kidnapping charged is that it was "done to facilitate the commission of 
another crime"); see also R. 6 (charging aggravated kidnapping based on defendant's 
"intent to inflict bodily injury on [the victim], or to terrorize the victim or another"); Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (Supp. 2001). 
In any case, under these facts, the Buggs factors, if even applicable, were clearly 
met. The aggravated kidnapping—which, based on the record, one could conclude took 
up most of the thirty-five minutes to an hour that Katrina and defendant spent in his home 
(R. 148:17)—was not "slight, inconsequential and merely incidental" to the attempted 
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murder that followed. State v. Buggs, 547 P.2d 720, 731 (Kan. 1976) (first Buggs factor). 
Nor was defendant's conduct during the charged kidnapping "of the kind inherent in the 
nature" of attempted murder based on strangulation. Id. (second Buggs factor). Finally, 
to the extent the third factor even applies to a kidnapping based on wholly distinct 
conduct, the kidnapping had "significance independent" of the attempted murder because 
it was completed before the attempted murder ever began. Id. (third Buggs factor). 
In discussing the first and second Buggs factors, defendant does not acknowledge 
the evidence showing a clear break in the violence between the aggravated kidnapping 
and the attempted murder. . See Aple. Br. at 24-29. In discussing the third factor, he 
acknowledges that Katrina was at one point able to flee defendant's locked bedroom and 
that she "agreed to go back into Lopez's bedroom if he put the gun away, which he did." 
Aple. Br. at 30-31 (emphasis added). He nonetheless maintains that his assault on 
Katrina was one uninterrupted event. See id. The evidence clearly establishes that it was 
not. 
Defendant's cases do not obscure that result. In Weber v. State, 547 A.2d 948, 951 
(Del. Supr. 1988), Weber went into a former girlfriend's home and engaged in a 
continous assault on her as the two moved from room to room in her house. Weber's 
assault then temporarily ceased when he became sick and the victim temporarily left. Id. 
It recommenced when the victim returned "to keep Weber from leaving and 'to get it over 
with." Id. Weber was subsequently convicted of aggravated kidnapping and assault. Id. 
In analyzing whether the kidnapping conviction merged with the assault conviction, the 
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court focused exclusively on the conduct that occurred before the defendant became ill. 
See, e.g. Weber, 547 A.2d at 959 ("[The victim] testified that she and Weber were 
fighting continuously from the time the assault began until Weber became sick and 
regurgitated.") (emphasis added). Where the assault was continuous, even though Weber 
and his victim traveled throughout the house, the court concluded that "[t]here is no 
evidence independent of Weber's assault on Long to support a separate conviction for 
kidnapping." Id. In the instant case, the assault on Katrina was not continuous. Thus, 
Weber is distinguishable. 
In State v. Mead, 318 N.W.2d 440, 441 (Iowa 1982), the defendant accosted a 
woman and her mother as they were about to enter the mother's home. The defendant 
first grabbed the mother and put a knife to her throat. Id. In response, the daughter hit 
the man, and the mother escaped. Id. at 442. The defendant then struck the daughter in 
her face, kicked her, and ran away with her purse. Id. The defendant was convicted of 
kidnapping and assault while participating in a burglary. Id. The court held that where 
the "case involves a seizure of [the mother] by defendant, not a confinement of her," and 
"[u]nder the statute, kidnapping cannot be predicated on merely 'seizing' another person," 
the trial court "should have dismissed the kidnapping count." Id. at 445. Here, in 
contrast to Mead, Utah's aggravated kidnapping statute encompasses both the seizure of a 
person as well as her confinement. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301, 76-5-302 (Supp. 
2001). In any case, defendant here clearly confined Katrina in his room when he locked 
her in it (R. 148:11,12). Thus, Mead is distinguishable. 
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Finally, mMesser v. Roberts, 74 F.3d 1009, 1011 (10th Cir. 1996), the defendant 
was convicted of aggravated battery and aggravated kidnapping based on evidence that he 
had attacked his victim and rendered her unconscious outside a store front and then 
dragged her fifteen feet to the back of the store and, while she was still unconscious, 
assaulted her again. The court, applying the Buggs factors, held that the movement was 
"'slight, inconsequential and merely incidental'" to the battery and did not make the 
battery "substantially easier of commission" or "lessen the risk of detection" because the 
battery had already been committed by the time of the movement, the second battery "did 
not occur in a different room, or behind something that could have hidden the incident 
from view," and the body was found "not behind furniture or other potential 
concealment." Id at 1014-15. Here, unlike in Messer, the State is not claiming that the 
asportation or confinement necessary to establish kidnapping occurred during the course 
of defendant's other crime, i.e., his attempted strangulation of Katrina. Rather, as 
previously stated, the aggravated kidnapping was complete when defendant confined 
Katrina in his bedroom and threatened her with a gun and with a piece of glass. 
Defendant's attempt to murder Katrina only followed later, after an agreed-upon cessation 
of hostilities. Thus, Messer also does not apply. 
Because the trial court erred in dismissing defendant's aggravated kidnapping 
charge, even if the Finlayson doctrine applies to pre-trial hearings, this Court should 
reverse the trial court's dismissal of the aggravated kidnapping charge. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to reverse the trial court's order 
and reinstate the aggravated kidnapping charge against defendant. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED V October 2004. 4 
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Utah Attorney General 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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